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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_______________ 
 
No. 13-3846 
_______________ 
 
PATRICIA FRANK, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-12-cv-00034) 
District Judge: Hon. Sean J. McLaughlin 
_________________________________ 
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 27, 2014 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 18, 2015) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Patricia Frank appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to The PNC 
Financial Services Group (“PNC”) on her claims that PNC’s termination of her 
employment with PNC violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 
29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
12101, et seq.  We will affirm. 
The facts of this case are recited in the district court’s opinion and need not be 
repeated here.  Frank v. The PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., 2013 WL 4432857 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
15, 2013).  
In the absence of direct evidence of age or disability discrimination, the district 
court properly applied the familiar burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).1  The court concluded that Frank could establish a prima 
facie case of age discrimination. The burden then shifted to PNC to articulate some 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Frank’s termination.  The district court found that 
PNC met that burden by claiming that it terminated Frank for violating its policy 
prohibiting force balancing.  PNC having met that burden, the burden rebounded to Frank 
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that PNC’s proffered explanation for her 
termination was pretextual.  In its thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the district court 
                                              
1 The McDonnell Douglas analysis applied to claims of employment discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is also applied to claims of employment 
discrimination under the ADEA and the ADA.  See, e.g., Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 
F.3d 495, 500 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 
2009); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 938 (3d Cir. 
1997); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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fully and completely explained why Frank failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding pretext.  Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment to PNC on 
Frank’s ADEA claim. 2013 WL 4432857 at *6-9.   We are in complete agreement with 
the district court’s explanation and holding that Frank failed to raise a triable issue of fact 
relative to pretext.  Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to PNC on Frank’s ADEA claim substantially for the reasons set forth in the 
district court’s opinion. 
The district court found that Frank failed to make out a prima facie case of 
disability discrimination under the ADA because she failed to present any evidence that 
the relevant decision-makers were aware of her claim that she had multiple sclerosis. 
Thus, the district court granted summary judgment to PNC on Frank’s ADA claim.  2013 
WL 4432857 at *9-10.  We will also affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment on that claim substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
